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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
-RETROACTIVE EFFECT-The United States Supreme Court has held
that parochial schools' good-faith, reasonable reliance upon an untested
state aid program that was subsequently declared unconstitutional as
involving "excessive entanglement" of church and state, justified a
district court order that allowed reimbursement for services rendered
prior to the program's invalidation.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973).
Pennsylvania's Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education Act"
(Act 109) was declared unconstitutional in Lemon v. Kurtzman2
(Lemon I) as violative of the establishment clause3 of the first amend-
ment. Act 109 provided for direct reimbursement of nonpublic schools
for amounts expended for secular subjects. Procedural safeguards were
found to foster an impermissible degree of entanglement between
church and state.4
Act 109 authorized the State Superintendent of Public Instruction
to purchase specific "secular" educational services5 from nonpublic
schools. Participating schools were directly reimbursed for amounts
expended for teachers, textbooks, and instructional materials for secular
courses. 6 Schools seeking reimbursement had to maintain prescribed
accounting procedures7 to identify the separate cost of secular services.
All accounts were subject to state audit s and textbooks and instructional
materials had to be approved by the State Superintendent of Public
Instruction. 9
Under Act 109 the state was to conduct continuing surveillance of
the programs, audit the special accounts as necessary, and compensate
the schools directly in four installments beginning the September fol-
lowing the year for which the schools incurred expenses.' 0 Affected
I. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5601-08 (1968) [hereinafter referred to as Act 109].
2. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
3. U.S. CONSr. amend. I, which states, "Congress shall make no law respecting an es-
tablishment of religion ... 
4. 403 U.S. at 614.
5. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 5604 (1968). Reimbursement was expressly prohibited for
courses containing any subject matter expressing religious teaching, or the morals or forms
of worship of any sect.
6. Id. The courses were mathematics, physical science, physical education and modern
foreign languages (not Latin, Hebrew or cassic Greek).
7. Id. § 5607.
8. Id.
9. Id. § 5604.
10. Id. § 5607.
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were 1181 nonpublic schools with a student population of 535,215.
Twenty-six per cent of the funds went to church-related schools; most
were Roman Catholic.
In July 1968, shortly after Act 109 went into effect, Alton J. Lemon
and other Pennsylvania citizens along with certain organizations de-
clared their intention to challenge its constitutionality. 1 In January
1969, the state and schools entered into contracts for the 1968-1969
school year. Plaintiffs filed a complaint in June 1969, asking that Act
109 be declared unconstitutional and that payments be enjoined. A
motion was simultaneously filed requesting a preliminary injunction
to restrain any payments under Act 109. On August 28, 1969, plaintiffs
abandoned their request for preliminary relief.
On November 29, 1969, a divided district court12 granted the state's
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief could be
granted. On December 19, 1969, Lemon filed a notice of appeal to the
Supreme Court.' s At no time did Lemon move for interlocutory relief
pending appeal even though the state and schools entered service con-
tracts in both January of 1970 and 1971.
On June 28, 1971, the Supreme Court held Act 109 unconstitutional
and remanded the matter to the district court. 4 Not until August when
Lemon filed a motion for summary judgment did he declare an inten-
tion to prevent reimbursement for services provided during the pre-
vious school year.
On remand, 15 summary judgment was entered for Lemon and pay-
ments under Act 109 for educational services performed after the date
of the Court's decision were enjoined. In Lemon v. Kurtzman16 (Lemon
II), Lemon challenged the scope of the district court injunction. He
asserted that $24 million set aside by Pennsylvania to compensate the
schools for services rendered prior to Lemon I should not be paid.
A majority of the Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Chief
Justice Burger,' 7 held that the district court did not abuse its discretion
11. 310 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1969). The organizational plaintiffs were denied standing
to challenge because they had no personal stake in the outcome. Standing was also denied
to other individual plaintiffs for the same reason. Lemon alleged the necessary personal
interest in that he had paid an admission fee to a Pennsylvania race track; fees from which
Act 109 was originally financed.
12. Id.
13. 397 U.S. 1034 (1970) (probable jurisdiction noted).
14. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
15. 348 F. Supp. 300 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
16. 411 U.S. 192 (1973).
17. The Chief Justice was joined by Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, with
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in allowing Pennsylvania to reimburse the schools for amounts ex-
pended in reliance on Act 109 prior to its invalidation.
Act 109 was held unconstitutional in Lemon I because it fostered
"excessive entanglement" between the state and church schools. The
entanglement arose through the ongoing state scrutiny of school pro-
grams that was necessary to insure that the funds were not supporting
religious teaching. A companion Rhode Island statute8 was invalidated
on similar grounds. Act 109 also had the further defect of providing
financial aid directly to the sectarian schools. 19 The Court noted a
broader base of entanglement of a different character in the political
potentials of the programs.20 State aid to parochial schools could be-
come a political issue on which candidates would be forced to take
sides and on which voters would find their votes following their reli-
gious beliefs.21 One of the basic purposes of the religion clauses was to
protect against political division along religious lines.22
The Lemon I majority opinion did not reach the question of whether
the statute's precautions kept the payments from offending the estab-
lishment clause with regard to the primary effect of promoting the
cause of religion. Instead they found that the cumulative effect 23 of the
restrictions in both statutes involved excessive entanglement between
state governments and religion. 24
After a summary explanation of the basis of Lemon I's holding and
mention of the chronology of events, the Court in Lemon II discussed
retroactive holdings generally. Frequently it has been asked to apply
new constitutional rights of defendants in criminal cases retroactively
to convictions predating the new developments. 25 Such relief has often
Justice White concurring. Justice Douglas dissented, joined by Justices Brennan and
Stewart. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration of the case.
18. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 16-51-1 (Supp. 1971). The act authorized salary supplements
of 15 per cent to nonpublic elementary school teachers who taught secular subjects.
19. The matter of direct payments to sectarian schools distinguishes the Lemon I
situation from Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 US. 1 (1947), which permitted a state to
reimburse parents of parochial school students for transportation expenses. Also distin-
guished is Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), which upheld a New York statute
requiring local public school authorities to purchase and lend textbooks free of charge
to all students within a particular grade bracket, including parochial school students.
20. 403 U.S. at 622.
21. Id.
22. Id.; Comment, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARv. L. Rav. 1680 (1969).
23. 403 U.S. at 614.
24. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970). Excessive entanglement with re-
ligion is regarded as one element of the cumulative criteria of the establishment clause
test. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968). The other elements are that the
statute must have a secular legislative purpose and its principal or primary effect must be
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion.
25. Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505 (1973); Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278 (1972); Desist
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been denied since Linkletter v. Walker 6 in 1965. The Court has also
recognized the doctrine of non-retroactivity outside the criminal area27
and in civil litigation. 28
While Lemon did not attempt to recover funds paid prior to Act
109's invalidation, he urged that the final payment be enjoined on the
principle that an unconstitutional statute is void and can confer no
rights or duties. The plaintiff considered Norton v. Shelby County,29
where it was held that payments could not be enforced against a county
bond issuer that patently lacked the power under the state constitution
to issue bonds, to be sound law with regard to retroactivity. He viewed
the numerous recent non-retroactive decisions to be mere departures
from a Norton norm. From his reasoning it followed logically that
Lemon I terminated the school's rights under Act 109. The Court dis-
agreed with the claim that Norton remained viable and re-iterated that
there is no set principle of retroactive validity or invalidity. 0 The logic
of plaintiff's challenge to some but not all of the payments under Act
109 was also questioned by the Court.81
Admitting the abstract appeal of Norton, its abandonment was re-
garded by the Court as a recognition that individuals must rely on
existing laws and that prior reliance82 plays a major role in the decision
to apply a new rule prospectively. While the formula 8 for the retro-
active rulings of the Linkletter line of cases was helpful in its decision,
the Court found that the problem in Lemon II related more closely to
the scope of federal equitable remedies.
The role of the Supreme Court in shaping equitable decrees is more
v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Johnson v.
New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966); Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
26. 381 U.S. 618 (1965). The fourth amendment rule of exclusion of illegally seized
evidence that was applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment in Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), was applied to cases pending when Mapp was decided, but not
to convictions that were final at that time.
27. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971); Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964); England v.
State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
28. City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma,
395 U.S. 701 (1969); Allen v. State Bd. of Educ., 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
29. 118 US. 425 (1856). "An unconstitutional act is, in legal contemplation, as inopera-
tive as though it had never passed." Id. at 442.
30. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 US. 618, 629 (1965).
31. 411 U.S. at 198. "Appellants urge . . . a strange amalgam of flexibility and abso-
lutism."
32. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 628 (1965).
33. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 298 (1967) (balance the weight of reason for the
decision against prior justifiable reliance and the impact of retroactivity on the adminis-
tration of justice).
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limited than the broad discretionary one assigned to the trial court.3 4
Equitable remedies are viewed as a "special blend of what is necessary,
what is fair, and what is workable."3' 5 The Court utilized two quotes
from Justice Douglas stating (1) "[t]he historic injunctive process
was designed to deter, not to punish"38 and (2) that equity is flexible
in shaping its remedies and may do so to reconcile public and private
needs.ar Equity rejects rigid absolutes and examines the practical reali-
ties that are a part of competing interests. The Court maintained that
the equity function does not change even if some interests have a
constitutional basis.88
The Court concluded that the proposed $24 million distribution of
state funds to nonpublic schools would not substantially undermine
the excessive entanglement holding of Lemon I. Since the state super-
intendent completed his supervisory task during the school year from
which the payments flow, the disputed sums would not require addi-
tional state examination to insure that the funds would be spent on
secular instruction. The plaintiff had not contested the precise quality
of the supervision required. The potential for political division over
the funds to nonpublic schools was no longer present because the
catalyst had been struck down.
There remained one state function after the schools would be re-
imbursed: a final post-audit. Undertaken once, it would cause little
contact with the schools since it only involved balancing the state's
books to close the accounts. This function would thus not disturb the
basis of Lemon I.
Lemon I did not reach the question of whether any payments pro-
viding state aid to parochial schools were repugnant to the religion
clauses.3 9 Even if there would be a constitutional interest in barring
all payments, the harm that would flow from one final payment was
considered minimal in Lemon I. It would be made only to protect
the financial stability of the schools that expended sums in reliance on
34. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). The district court
ordered a school board to devise plans for elementary and secondary school and faculty
desegregation. The court of appeals vacated that order with respect to the elementary
schools. In re-establishing the district court order, the Supreme Court noted that district
courts have broad power to fashion remedies that will assure unitary school systems and
that the question of review is limited to whether the order was reasonable, feasible and
workable.
35. 411 U.S. 192, 200 (1973).
36. Hecht v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944).
37. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955).
38. 411 U.S. at 201.
39. 403 U.S. at 613.
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Act 109. The payments represented no risk of entanglement since only
the post-audit remained and the state scrutiny that doomed the enact-
ment would insure that payments only compensate secular services.
School reliance on Act 109 provided the foundation of the Lemon II
decision. Reliance interests are an important consideration in equity,40
and it is readily apparent that the district court considered the degree
of reliance by the church schools on the promised reimbursements.
41
When the plaintiffs withdrew the motion for a preliminary injunction
to block the first payments under Act 109 in August 1969, they de-
scribed their position as a "sensible recognition of the practical realities
of the situation. '42 Not until August 1971, after the Lemon I decision
and six months after contracts for the 1970-1971 school year were per-
fected, did Lemon attempt to block payments owed for services already
rendered.43 The Court emphasized the failure to apply for interlocu-
tory relief for two years. That failure was considered to have encour-
aged reliance on Act 109,44 thereby making .Lemon's position even
more tenuous in the Court's review of the district court's order.
The Court admitted that the schools did not show their exact re-
liance in expectation of reimbursement for the 1970-1971 school year.
It maintained, however, that the complexity of such a determination
for each of 1181 nonpublic schools would be prohibitive. 45 In a foot-
note46 in its section on reliance, the Court conceded that the deter-
mination of reliance would be subtle and based more on credibility
than on facts of record. It went on to state that "[i]ncreased expendi-
tures for any of the gamut of a school's activities might have been in-
curred in reliance on reimbursement for services covered by Act 109." 4 7
The Lemon I decision was considered to be one of first impression. 48
Act 109 was upheld by a divided district court, while a different district
40. See City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma,
395 US. 701 (1969).
41. 348 F. Supp. 300, 304-05 (E.D. Pa. 1972). . . . [T]he nonpublic schools adjusted their
budgets accordingly and performed the services required by them. . . . [T]o deny the
church-related schools any reimbursement for their services rendered would impose upon
them a substantial burden which would be difficult for them to meet."
42. 348 F. Supp. 300 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (at the time plaintiffs withdrew their motion
schools had completed providing the particular services for the 1968-1969 school year).
43. Id.
44. 411 U.S. at 204.
45. Id. at 205.
46. Id. n.6.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 206. The Court felt that Lemon I's resolution was not clearly foreshadowed.
See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971) (the opinion referred to a first im-
pression, not clearly foreshadowed, as one of three factors considered in deciding on retro-
active treatment).
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court held a similar Rhode Island statute unconstitutional. Even the
Supreme Court was divided on the issue. The existence of such un-
certainty dispelled, in the Court's opinion, Lemon's assertion that the
statute was plainly unlawful. Although plaintiffs stated their intention
to challenge Act 109's constitutionality soon after its enactment, the
nonpublic schools were not considered to have relied on the statute
in bad faith. Decisions that preceded Lemon I did not apply the estab-
lishment clause broadly. Rather, they focused on the particular circum-
stances of each case before them, the primary purpose and effect of the
enactment, 49 the interaction of church and state in modern life,5° and
the difficulty of drawing distinctions when funds are intended for the
general welfare. 51
Chief Justice Burger reduced Lemon's contention to a statement
that the schools' reliance on Act 109 was unjustified because the statute
had not been adjudged constitutional. State officials should therefore
run the risk of retroactive nullification if they execute statutes without
judicial ratification. 52 The Court countered with the contention that
state officials must be permitted freedom to execute their legislative
enactments expeditiously, especially when they involve no fixed con-
stitutional precedent.5 Act 109 was intended to help nonpublic schools
through a crisis period of skyrocketing costs. The statute resulted from
a legislative conclusion that Pennsylvania's educational goals could best
be served through support of the secular functions of nonpublic
schools.54 The elaborate safeguards that resulted in excessive entangle-
ment of religion and state clearly protected against the more obvious
evil: state support of religious functions.
The concept of federalism requires that federal courts limit their
intervention, particularly with regard to injunctions, in both state
judicial55 and legislative56 processes. If it should become necessary for
a federal injunction to be issued, the remedy must be flexible enough
49. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 US. 664, 669 (1970).
50. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,
242-43 (1968).
51. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 US. 1, 14 (1947).
52. 411 U.S. at 207.
53. Id. at 208.
54. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 5602 (1968).
55. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
56. See San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). "... [O]ne of the first
principles of constitutional adjudication [is] the basic presumption of the constitutional
validity of a duly enacted state or federal law." Id. at 60 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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to preserve the position of all parties and to negate the imposition of
unnecessary harm while the final determination is pending.
5 7
Given the nonpublic schools' good-faith reliance on Act 109 and
Lemon's failure to seek interim relief, along with the Lemon I en-
tanglement basis, the narrow decisions of other establishment clause
cases and the limited scope of equitable review, the district court hold-
ing that allowed Pennsylvania to reimburse its nonpublic schools for
contracts completed the previous year was upheld.
Justice Douglas' dissent 5s was based on the constitutional argument
that was not reached in Lemon I or by the Lemon 1I majority, i.e.,
whether any direct payment to sectarian schools violates the establish-
ment clause. He did not distinguish between a grant owed by the state
for past services and a current one, because both would force a tax-
payer to contribute a portion of his tax dollars to sectarian schools.
In his Lemon I concurring opinion,59 Justice Douglas demonstrated
that whether funds were allocated for secular functions or otherwise,
they would have the effect of freeing extra funds for religious purposes
in the schools that would have been allotted to secular education. He
considered this effect violative of the establishment clause.
Non-retroactive criminal cases were deemed inapplicable because
their problem was one of comparing a new rule to procedures under
an old rule.60 Justice Douglas read the rule that no direct state sub-
sidies should flow to religious institutions as having remained viable
since the time of James Madison;61 therefore, this situation was not one
in which an old rule was being replaced by a new one. No mention was
made of what role Act 109 and the actual reliance by the nonpublic
schools would play in the old rule-new rule analogy.
Justice Douglas viewed the various religion clause cases62 as giving
"clear warning" that subsidies such as Act 109 would be unconstitu-
tional. If Act 109 was obviously unconstitutional there could have been
57. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 208 n.8 (1973).
58. Justice Brennan and Justice Stewart joined in the dissent.
59. 403 U.S. at 641 (Douglas, J., concurring).
60. 411 US. at 211.
61. See J. MADISON, THE MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELiGious AssESSMENTS,
Two WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON (G. Hunt ed. 1901). "The same authority which can
force a citizen to contribute three pence of his property for the support of any one estab-
lishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment."
62. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) ("Government may not finance
religious groups . . . nor blend secular and sectarian education . . . ."); McCollum v.
Board of Educ., $33 U.S. 203, 210 (1948); Everson v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 1, 16 (1947)
("No tax in any amount ... can be levied to support any religious activities or Institu-
tions .. whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.').
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no good-faith reliance by the nonpublic schools, and they should not
profit from the statute. The schools' position in relying on Act 109
was compared to that of a losing litigant who has relied on doubtful
advice.03 This point is purportedly supported in a footnote 4 that cites
criminal retroactivity cases. This support seems inconsistent, however,
with the dissent's previous dismissal of criminal retroactivity cases as
not relevant to the Lemon II situation.
The dissent did not attach any weight to plaintiff's failure to seek
interim relief before Lemon I was decided or to the effect of the with-
drawal of the request for preliminary relief. Instead, the principle
that any direct state subsidy to a religious institution is unconstitutional
was considered absolute and to be strictly adhered to, despite plaintiff's
equitable deficiencies and the actual reliance by the schools on Act
109 for three years.
When Chief Justice Burger admitted in a footnote 65 that "increased
expenditures for any gamut of a school's activities might have been
incurred in reliance on reimbursement for services covered by Act
109," he obviously intended to demonstrate the difficulty of determin-
ing the specific reliance on Act 109. However, the statement appears
to be an admission that the funds from Act 109 freed the schools to
apply more of their own resources to sectarian teaching. It was on this
point that Justice Douglas based his argument. He viewed the school
as an organism living on one budget, and felt that any attempt to
finance the secular portion of a parochial school's educational program
makes the religion clause question turn on accounting entries.66
Justice Douglas' point makes enough sense that it should not have
been left unanswered by the majority. After the Court turned from its
discussion of the equity function to an examination of the constitu-
tional issues presented by the final payment, Justice Burger purported
to address himself to the question of whether any payment impinged on
the establishment clause. He spoke of the "insoluble paradox" of
payments being denied to parochial schools if religion is taught in the
same classrooms as secular subjects, while if the state exacts a promise
63. 411 US. at 211.
64. Id. n.2. Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 295 (1968), gave retroactive effect to the
rule of Bruton v. United States, 391 US. 123 (1968), regarding the non-admissability of a
confession by one conspirator at the trial of another. The old standard had been under
attack since its inception. Retroactive effect was given despite the fact that there would
be a substantial impact upon the administration of justice.
65. 411 U.S. at 205 n.6.
66. 403 U.S. at 641.
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that sectarian and secular activities will be separated and enforces it,
the aid is void because of the "excessive entanglement" aspect of the
establishment clause.67 The problem was dismissed as solved in the
Lemon II situation since the oversight that is both necessary and un-
constitutional was already an accomplished fact and could not reoccur.6 8
The Court's treatment confused the question that it claimed to be
answering. Its thinking never left the realm of the Lemon I decision.
It did not reach the point that Justice Douglas considered crucial, that
the schools would be able to channel their own funds (which they would
have been required to spend on secular services69) to religious teaching.
Since the equitable considerations supported the Court's position, it
should have faced the only contrary argument rather than elude it.
Since Everson v. Board of Education,70 decisions that have upheld
programs benefitting parochial school students have distinguished their
challenged plans from ones that would involve direct payments to
religious schools.71 The Court cites some of these same cases to show
that decisions have not approached the establishment clause broadly32
It fails, however, to distinguish the plans that were upheld from the
direct payments of Act 109. This view of the scope of the establishment
clause line of cases supports the Court's contention that the Lemon I
issue was not clearly foreshadowed. To support its first impression argu-
ment, the Court quoted itself from Lemon I, "that we can only dimly
perceive the lines of demarcation in this extraordinary sensitive area
of constitutional law." 73 In Lemon I that line was spoken of in relation
to Justice Black's statement in Everson v. Board of Education4 that the
67. Id. at 668 (White, J., concurring).
68. 411 U.S. at 203 n.3.
69. Cf. Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (recognized that religious
schools provide both secular and sectarian education, and that a state education statute
could not compel students to attend public schools if religious schools meet minimum
secular education requirements.)
70. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
71. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970) (a grant of property tax exemptions
to churches was held not to be sponsorship of religion since government did not transfer
part of its revenue to churches, but simply abstained from demanding that churches
support the state. "Obviously a direct money subsidy would be a relationship pregnant
with involvement."); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1968) (a New York
statute was upheld that required public school authorities to lend textbooks, free of
charge, to parochial school students as well as to public school students. "Thus no funds
or books are furnished to parochial schools and the financial benefit is to parents and
children, not to schools."); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 308-09 (1952) ("This released
time program involves neither religious instruction in public school classrooms nor the
expenditure of public funds.").
72. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S.
236, 242-43 (1968).
73. 403 U.S. at 612.
74. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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decision there "carried to the verge of the forbidden territory under the
Religion Clauses." Everson upheld transportation reimbursements to
parents of public and parochial school children. That opinion empha-
sized that the state had not contributed funds to the schools and did not
support them.
To cite Everson and its accompanying language in support of the
contention that the line of demarcation is opaque with regard to direct
payments is arguably a misuse of Justice Black's opinion. Everson could
be considered proper precedent for the notion that lines are generally
not clear in this area, but it stands opposite to the principle that direct
payments to parochial schools might fit within the opaque area,75 for
Everson stated clearly that direct payments would contravene the reli-
gion clauses.7 6
The Court also overstated Lemon's contention with regard to the
function of state officials. It concluded that he would have state officials
stay their hands until newly enacted state programs were ratified by the
federal courts.77 This statement had no basis in fact. The request for
preliminary relief was withdrawn shortly after Act 109 was passed, and
final payments were challenged only after the statute had been declared
unconstitutional. The Court's summation might have been on point
if Lemon had requested that the schools return all the funds received
under Act 109, but he did not.
Lemon IH will likely have little effect outside the facts of the case.
A similar problem should not reappear because the force of Lemon I's$,excessive entanglement" holding will preclude any future claims of
good-faith reliance by non-public schools. The case actually utilizes a
more limited scope of review of equitable decrees than it professes,
since the Court never considered the only issue that challenged the dis-
trict court ruling. If the constitutionality of any payments under Act
109 had been considered at the outset and found to be lacking, the
strength of the equities in favor of allowing a final payment would
have been diminished. The Court's omission was probably calculated.
Broad establishment clause decisions have been consistently avoided
in the past as the Court has moved toward a position of neutrality re-
garding church-state relationships.78 Even Justice Douglas admitted in
75. Id. at 18. "The state contributes no money to the schools. It does not support them."
76. Id. at 15.
77. 411 U.S. at 201.
78. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). Property tax exemptions for churches
were upheld in this recent neutrality decision; based in part on the theory that if the state
715
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Zorach v. Clauson79 that ". . . we find no constitutional requirement
which makes it necessary for government . . . to throw its weight
against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious influence. The
government must be neutral ... ."80 Invalidation of the final payment
under Act 109 might have colored the Court's current neutral stand
toward separation of church and state.
Stephen F. Ban
had to remain neutral toward religious institutions and could not provide them with aid,
the institutions should not be forced to support the state.
79. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
80. Id. at 314.
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